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What would be the characteristics of an ‘independent’ Scotland? And what kind
of a Member State would it be? Intriguingly, the pro-independence Yes Scotland
campaign promises continuity on key issues, such as the currency, the Queen,
and the European Union. In a recent paper, Sionaidh Douglas-Scott claims that
the process of continuing EU membership for an independent Scotland will be
‘relatively smooth and straightforward’ – a claim that has been taken up by Yes
Scotland. (Given the at best ambivalent and at worst antagonistic attitude of the
UK, the promise of continuity is not necessarily good news for the European Union).
The strength of this claim rests on Douglas-Scott’s preference for Article 48 TEU
(the Treaty revision procedure) rather than Article 49 TEU (the Treaty accession
procedure). In other words, she assumes that the EU would welcome Scottish
independence with a simple and internal procedural change, rather than with an
insistence on a cumbersome accession process.
There are two problems with using Article 48. First, it is the provision by which
existing member states organise their relationships with non-Member States and
international organisations. Unlike Article 49, it was not designed to bring about the
institutional changes needed to accommodate a new Member State. Second, in his
evidence to the House of Commons, Prof. Kenneth Armstrong exposes the ‘smooth
and straightforward’ claim as fallacious by highlighting the risky nature of Article 48.
For starters, the Scottish Government would have to rely on the UK government to
initiate and manage the negotiation process. But in addition, Article 48 would create
an opportunity for the UK government to hijack the process in order to renegotiate
the UK’s own relationship with the European Union. Even assuming goodwill from
the other Member States about the principle of membership of an independent
Scotland, the UK’s renegotiation strategy in particular, and the negotiation process
as a whole, may very well meet with fierce resistance. Far from being ‘smooth and
straightforward’, Prof. Armstrong points to a danger that:
‘…the process [under Article 48] becomes lengthened rather than
shortened. If it was a normal accession process under Article 49, there is
every reason to believe it possible that the negotiation element could be
conducted by the preferred date for independence. That would still leave
open the ratification of that agreement, which might take several months, if
not longer, to do.’
Douglas-Scott’s paper is further marked by an absence of political context. She
is correct to note that the EU is not the slave of public international law, and that
it is capable of reacting in ‘pragmatic and purposive’ fashion to current affairs
unregulated by the Treaties, as it did for example in 1990 when Germany unified.
But she does not discuss the current politics of secession in the EU, which is very
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different from the situation in 1990. German reunification did not result in immediate
Treaty change. East Germany acceded to West Germany, and Germany accepted
the (unchanged!) Treaty rules relating to the institutions, the weighting of Council
votes, and the allocation of seats in the European Parliament. From the perspective
of the European Community in 1990, reunification did not change the way it operated
and was, therefore, waved through.
By contrast, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain can have no interest in witnessing
the diminution of the United Kingdom and in setting a precedent for other European
secessionist movements. Experience shows that the international community as a
whole shows an interest in the activities of states especially in cases of break-ups.
Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece, Cyprus did not recognise Kosovo’s unilateral
declaration of independence in 2008 in order not to set a precedent for separatists in
their own countries.
That said, Douglas-Scott is correct to assume that there will be Member States
who will be supportive of Scottish independence, especially if clear support for it
was demonstrated in a referendum. If the United Kingdom resolves the matter in a
procedurally fair and transparent manner, the attitude of the Commission and the
other Member States may be positively influenced and Scotland’s application could
be fast-tracked. The UK’s attitude may in turn depend on how Scotland behaves
during the independence negotiations, and whether the negotiations have been
conducted co-operatively and amicably, or the reverse.
Finally, an independent Scotland will not be fully compliant with the EU’s acquis
communautaire. As Daniel Kenealy has noted, ‘Scotland is only compliant by virtue
of being part of the UK and thus covered by the UK’s institutions and regulatory
structures’. The loss of membership status following separation means that Scotland
would no longer benefit from the UK’s derogation from the single currency and from
the Common Travel Area (Schengen Agreement). An independent Scotland would
not inherit the opt-outs the UK negotiated for the Treaty of Maastricht. The formal
position is as follows. All Member States (except UK and Denmark, who secured
opt-outs in the Maastricht Treaty) are expected eventually to join the Mechanism
and to adopt the Euro. All the new Member States since 2004 are legally obliged to
adopt the Euro at some future point, with no opt-out clauses. If Scotland wishes for
membership to be ‘smooth and straightforward’, should it not better prepare itself to
adopt the Euro and to sign up to Schengen?
In sum, Douglas-Scott’s reliance on Article 48 is far from persuasive on technical
legal grounds (is it the correct legal basis to accommodate a new Member State?)
as well as for strategic reasons (the negotiation process may well be dominated by
the UK’s negotiating team pursuing its own agenda). But even if an independent
Scotland’s continued membership in the EU were ‘smooth and straightforward’,
Douglas-Scott provides no answer to the question as to what kind of member
an independent Scotland would be (Europhile? Eurosceptic? Europhobic?) and
what the terms of membership would be. Instead, her contribution perpetuates
the language of continuity for membership and for citizenship which, given the
UK’s often fractious relationship with the EU, is not necessarily a good thing. The
outside observer is none the wiser as to the characteristics, indeed the meaning, of
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‘independence’, and completely in the dark as to whether an independent Scotland
would welcome the EU.
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